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IMPERFECT OBSERVATION AND
SYSTEMATIC POLICY ERROR
B WILLIAM E. CONRAD
This paper assesses the quantitative significance of the systematic policy errors resultingfrom
optimal policy responses to imperfect information. The policy response mechanism is provided
by the solution to the linear-quadratic control problem with additive model disturbances an4
noisy observations on the current state of the economy. The policy is implemented using a small
quarterly U.S. macro model andobservation error" covariance matrix estimates from NIA
revisions data. Pairs of simulations are run with one model equation at a time being shocked.
In the first run of the pair, exact observations are used in determining the policy response. In
the second run, exact observations again are used, but the Kalman. filter is employed as if the
observations were subject to error. Thus, we are able to focus on the systematic differences
in the time paths of both policy and endogenous variables resulting from the differences between
appropriate responses to exact and to imperfect data.
This paper assesses the quantitative significance of the systematic ten-
dency toward delayed policy response to economic developments implied
by an optimal response to imperfect data. In setting policy, the policy-
maker responds to incoming data reflecting economicdevelopments,
present and recently past. In fact, the incoming dataprovide an imperfect
reflection of economic developments since sometimes the data are subject
to substantial error.' The existence of error in thedata on which he must
rely creates a two-horned dilemma for the policymaker: on the one hand,
if he ignores the possibility of observation error and responds fully and
immediately to the incoming data as if it were perfect, he will frequently
react to what turns out to be merely aberrations in thedata; on the other
hand, if he delays policy response until the situation clarifies, he will gen-
erally fail to react to economic disturbances when appropriate. If either
course is followed, poor performanceresults.2 Clearly, an appropriate
response will involve a course somewhere inbetween the two extremes,
leading to the presence of both types of error, but in moderation.
In the following section, the optimal policy response mechanismis
sketched out and its implications for systematic policy error discussed.
The succeeding three sections set forth the various elements needed to
implement the policy response mechanism in order to assess the quantita-
tive significance of systematic policy error. In the final sections, simula-
tion exercises based on the optimal response framework are used to com-
1A detailed examination of Nationa' Income Account revisions is available inCole
(4, chapter 1).
2The implications of policy response to provisional data are examined by Conrad (5).
Phillips (8) examined the effects of lags on the performance of stabilization policy.
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247pare the responses to identical disturbances withperfect data and with
data known to be subject toerror.
I. THE POLICY RESPONSE MECHANISM
The problem of policy formulation ismodeled as a multiperiod dy-
namic minimization of the expected valueof the policymaker's loss func-
tion over a finite planning horizon subjectto the constraint of a linear
macro-economic model and complicated by imperfectobservation of the
state of the economy. Thus, thereare three distinct entities involved in the
problem specification_the model, theloss function, and the observation
process.
The economic model isa general vector first order linear difference
equation of the form:
=Ax1+Bu1 + C; + w
where x, u, and zare endogenous variables, policy variables, andexo-
genous variables respectively, andw1 is a disturbance vector assumed to
be Gaussian with meanzero and independent over time.
E(w1)=0E(w1w,')=W E(w1wJ)=0ij
The loss function A is assumedto be additive over time with each
period's loss quadratic in endogenousand policy variables.
N
(x1-1)'Q(x1-) +(u11 - -
where ,ü11 are the target values for the endogenousand policy variables
respectively andQand R are symmetric positive semidefinitepenalty
matrices. During the optimization horizon,observational information on
the state of the economycomes from an observation process described by
=x1 + v1i= 0,,,N -I
where v1 is a Gaussian random variable ofknown density having mean
zero, independent over time, and independent of allw
E(v1)=0E(v1v)=V E(v1vJ)=0ij
It is assumed, however, that allexogenous variables for each time period
are known exactly at the outset and that the values ofall policy variables
in prior periodsare known exactly.
Problems of this type have been explored extensively inthe engineering
systems literature; a derivation of the solutionto this secific problem is
248
pare the responses to identical disturbances withperfect data and with
data known to be subject toerror.
I. THE POLICY RESPONSE MECHANISM
The problem of policy formulation ismodeled as a multiperiod dy-
namic minimization of the expected valueof the policymaker's loss func-
tion over a finite planning horizonsubject to the constraint ofa linear
macro-economic model and complicated by imperfectobservation of the
state of the economy. Thus, thereare three distinct entities involved in the
problem specificationthe model, theloss function, and the observation
process.
The economic model isa general vector first order linear difference
equation of the form:
x11=Ax,+Bu1 + Cz1 + w1
where x1, u1, and z1 are endogenousvariables, policy variables, andexo-
genous variables respectively, andw1 is a disturbance vector assumed to
be Gaussian with meanzero and independent over time.
E(w,)=0E(w1w,')=W E(w1wJ)=0ij
The loss function A is assumedto be additive over time with each
period's loss quadratic in endogenousand policy variables.
N
A=(x1 -)'Q(x1- k) + (u11 - ü11)'R(u1-
where ,i1 are the target values for the endogenousand policy variables
respectively andQand R are symmetric positive semidefinitepenalty
matrices. During the optimization horizon,observational information on
the state of the economycomes from an observation process described by
=x1 + vi= 0,,,N -I
where v1 is a Gaussian random variableof known density havingmean
zero, independent over time, and independent of allw
E(v1)=0 E(;)=V E(v1vJ)=0ij
It is assumed, however, that allexogenous variables for each time period
are known exactly at the outset and that the valuesof all policy variables
in prior periods are known exactly.
Problems of this type have been explored extensively inthe engineering
systems literature; a derivation of the solutionto this secific problem is
248availableelsewhere3and will not be given in detail. The solution involves
two separable parts: I) a feedback rule giving the optimal policy response
to the estimated state of the economy and 2) a state esljmation procedure
involving the Kalman filter.4
The optimal policy in period i, u7, can be represented by the response
function
u7 = G,s1 + g
whereS1IS the state estimate, which is the expectation ofxconditional
upon past and current observations on the endogenous variables and the
known actual values of past policy and exogenous variables.
The generation of the estimate of the current state of the economy,Si,
involves the combination of the current observation, y, and a projection
using the model and an estimate of the state in the previous period.If we
denote the projection of the current state of the economy,p1, where
p, = AS1_1 + Bu1.., + Cz_,
then
Si = T1N'p1 + T1V'y1
where T. is the variance matrix of
T = (Nt' + V-'y'
and N is the variance of the projection error5
N1 = W + AT1,A'
The projection error variance reflects (I) the inadequacy of the model in
representing the economic process so that, even given the right starting
point, the projection would diverge somewhat from the actual movement
of the economy, and (2) error in the estimate of the past state of the
economy leading to error in projecting the current state independent of
the model's shortcomings.
Together, the state estimate, Si' and the reaction function defining
u7 given 5, constitute the optimal policy response in the face of imperfect
observational information.
Given a stable model, both the policy response matrix G. and the
3For background in the engineering literature, the reader isreferred to Aoki (1),
Astrom (2) and Sage (9). This specific problem is treated in Conrad (5 pp. 3 1-53).
4The combination of multiple sources of information in generating forecasts has re-
cently received attention (7). Also, the role of forecasts in stabilization policy has been re-
viewed (6).
5Due to possible matrix singularity, an alternative computational scheme based on
Conrad (5, pp. 48-51) was used in the empirical work.
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249state estimation apparatus, N, and T,, will converge to constant values
away from arbitrary arid unrealistic end point assumptions, i.e., perfect
knowledge of the starting point and no concern for policy effects beyond
the horizon. Thus, it will be sufficient to examine the pattern of policy
responses corresponding to these converged values.
II. POLICY RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS RESULTING FROM
IMPERFECT OBSERVATION
As was noted in the introduction, the existence of observation error
leads to two types of policy errorsa failure to react with desirable speed
and force to economic disturbances and a tendency to take undesirable
policy action to offset what later are seen to have been data errors. The
nature of the lag in policy response resulting from the optimal policy
apparatus can readily be seen. Since y, = Ax1_+ Bu1_1 + Cz_1 +
w._1 + v, any disturbance w_1 appears in a term which gets only part of
the weight in forming the state estimate.P- will not reflect w_1 at all. In
fact, w,_1 will show up only partially in p+1and then only to the degree
that it has been incorporated in s,. Thus, the policy response to a shock,
w, is closely related to the speed with which the shock becomes incor-
porated in the state estimateSi.
On the other hand, since y, which contains the observation errorv,
gets part of the weight in the state estimate, the policy adopted will include
some response to the observation error. Error from this source will not
lead to any systematic bias in policy response to economic developments.
In order to implement the policy response mechanism outlined above,
we require a detailed specification of the three major elements of the prob-
lem statement, i.e., the model, the loss function, and the observation
process. These elements are outlined in the next three sections.
III. THE MODEL
The simulation exercises are conducted using a small quarterly linear
model of the U.S. economy estimated over the period 1957111 through
197411. The model has 13 endogenous variables and 11 stochastic equa-
tions. Consumer expenditures on durables are treated separately from
consumption of nondurables and services. There are separate equations
for each of the three main components of investment: inventory, residen-
tial construction and plant and equipment. Definitions of GNP and dis-
posable income, together with an import equation, complete the expendi-
ture sector. A single money market equation is used to generate the short
term (Treasury bill) interest rate: and a term-structure equation supplies
the long term (corporate bond) rate. The wage rate equation is based on
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250Kuh's marginalvalueproductoflaborapproach and the price level is de-
termined by a markup equation. Unemploymentis the difference between
the labor force adjusted to take intoaccount the discouraged-worker
effect, and level of employment.
The policy apparatus consists of threevariablesgovernment ex-
penditures, a lump sum tax surcharge,and the money supply. Taxesare
defined as the sum of the surchargeand an endogenous component de-
termined by a constant leakagerate used in defining disposable income
analogous to an overall tax rate but includingother net withdrawals from
GNP as well.
The dynamic properties of this modelare reasonable. The model is
stable with the largest eigenvalue less thanone in modulus, and the steady
state multipliers are not out of line with thoseof larger models. The
eventual response of real GNP toa $1 sustained increase in real govern-
ment expenditures is $2.21. A sustained SIreal tax surcharge increase
leads to a $1 .93 decrease in GNP, whilea $1 increase in the money supply
leads eventually to a $.76 increase inGNP. The fiscal policy dynamic
multipliers indicate substantial initial impact.The peak impact on GNP is
reached after 6 quarters fora sustained increase in government expendi-
tures and after 7 quarters for the tax surcharge. Thepeaks are followed by
quite damped cycles. Theresponse to monetary policy is much smoother
and more gradual; the peakresponse to a sustained increase in the money
supply is reached after 8 quarters.
IV. Loss FUNCTION AND TARGET PATHS
The general statement of the optimizationproblem presupposes a
quadratic loss function. The remainingchoices involve the relative weights
to place on the departureson the various endogenous and policy variables
from their target paths; the choice oftarget paths will not affect the results
since they enter additively. Aftersome experimentation, penalties of 300,
5, 100, and 30 were chosen for squared deviationsin employment, GNP,
the price level, and nonresidential fixed investment,respectively. In the
simulations, only one policy variablewas left relatively free at a time
(penalty weight of .01 compared to 9999 forthe other two). This provided
a much clearer pattern of policyresponse to the disturbance by avoiding
instances of "fine tuning" in whichpolicy variables moved in opposing
directions.
V. DATA, REvisioNs ANDTHE OBSERVATION PROCESS
Neither "measurement error"nor "observation error" captures the
complexity of economic data problems.In the physical sciences it is the
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251usual case that the magnitude of observation error can be obtained di-
rectly from knowledge of the precision of the instruments used to measure.
However, economic data does not lend itself to such convenient specifica-
tion of the error characteristics.In fact, the majority of numbers re-
ported quarterly are hard to reconcile with the intuitive meaning of the
word "observations," since they involve a combination of partially re-
ported series with extrapolations (and, in revision, interpolations) of other
series reported annually and even less frequently.6
The estimate of the observation error covariance matrix is based
mainly on National Income Accounts data for the period 1965111 through
197711. For each data item, the most recent revision available on a com-
patible conceptual basis was subtracted from each earlier reported value
of the particular item. The resulting differencesor observation errors
can be viewed as samplings from a stationary normal process. Thesample
covariance is used as an estimate of the covariance of the observation
process in computing the optimal state estimate.
VI. SIMULATION OF POLICY RESPONSE
The multiplicity of stochastic elements in the problema disturbance
vector and an observation error vector for each period of simulation
poses a potential difficulty in evaluating the characteristics ofpolicy re-
sponse resulting from the Kalman filter. Because we are workingin a
linear framework, however, the errors have additive impacts, and thus we
may proceed to examine one source of error at a time. Also, because we
are interested solely in the typical responsepatternwhich is embodied
solely in the policy response mechanismthe observation errors them-
selves are not needed since they would not lead to any further systematic
influence on policy responses. Thus, we need only concern ourselves with
the disturbance vector, w. Since the disturbances also have additive im-
pacts, it will be convenient to shock only one variable at a time. And be-
cause we use converged values of the policy responseand filter mecha-
nisms, it will be sufficient to shock onl.y one period; the response in other
periods would be the same. Finally, in order to facilitate focusing on the
response to the shock, we first run a deterministic simulationwithout dis-
turbances or observation errors to serve as a benchmark. The shocked
simulations will be compared as deviations from this deterministic bench-
mark. This procedure has the advantage that our results are independent
of the target paths chosen for the endogenous and policy variables, the
time path of exogenous variables and the initial conditions.
In order to compare policy responses with exact observation to those
6CoIe (4) provides an introduction to some of the considerations along with references
to the literature.
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252with imperfect observation, three series of eight pairs of simulations were
run. In each series of simulations, only one policy variable was free to re-
spond to disturbances while the other two policy variables were im-
mobilized by large penalties for deviations from their respective target
paths. The eight pairs of simulations in each series correspond to the eight
imperfectly observed endogenous variables; in each pair of runs, a single
equation was subjected to a shock having the size of the standard error of
the regression residuals from the structural equations without the auto-
regressive correction. In the first run of each pair, it was assumed that the
endogenous variables were observed exactly. Thus, policy could respond
directly to x, rather than to the state estimates. In the secondrun of the
pair, the policy was assumed to respond to imperfect observations so that
the state estimation apparatus was used even though the observations
were in fact exact. Thus, the pair of runs involve alternative responses to
the same shock with the only difference being that in one case policy re-
sponses are based on the assumption that exact observations are available
and in the other case the data is assumed to be subject to error typical of
those encountered in the NIA revisions.
The simulation results show significantly different patterns of policy
response between the two runs of each pair. (Table 1) In the case of the
six expenditure variables, the policy response in the first period after the
disturbance under the assumption of imperfect information is weaker than
the response relying on exact information; this is true for each of the three
policy instruments used.
In the case of EM PT, the policy response with imperfect information
is perverse in that it moves in the opposite direction from the response to
exact information. The response to the shock to PGNP is stronger under
imperfect observation than otherwise. (Of course, this stronger response is
not preferable. The response with exact observation assumed is the best
possible response to the shock; any other response--strongeror weaker
will lead to a higher loss.)
An examination of the state estimates provides considerable insight
into the nature of the policy response pattern evident in thecase of EMPT
and PGNP shocks. In the case of EMPT, itis clear that the typical
covariances between EMPT and PGNP played an important role in the
state estimate. Even though the increase in the level of EMPT is sub-
stantially underestimated, this increase leads to an estimated slight in-
crease in PGNP, when in fact, PGNP actually fell slightly. Thus, the
policy response to the state estimate was in a restrictive direction; while
with exact observation, a slightly more expansionary stancewas taken to
accommodate the fortuitous increase in employment.
The situation is much the same with PGNP. Typical covariance pat-
terns suggested that the increase in PGNP, implied an expansion in
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3XGNP and its components. In this case, however, the appropriatepolicy
direction to offset the PGNP shock was itself restrictive. Thus, the ap-
pearance of expansion given by the filter caused alarger move toward re-
straint even though the size of the increase in PGNP was itself under-
estimated. (See Table 2)
After the first period, it is more difficult to interpret the differences in
the patterns of response because the differing first period responseshave
left different inherited conditions for the second period.Consequently,
different responses are called for, in part as a result of thedifferent in-
herited states of the economy and in part as a result of thedifferences in
the policy formation mechanism. It is only in the first period that the re-
sults differ solely as a consequence of the assumption about the presence
or absence of observation error, so that we canfocus on this element
alone. However, the first period results clearly show that the assumption
of imperfect information typically builds in a systematic lag in recognition
and policy response, although other varieties pf systematic distortion are
also encountered.
It would be desirable to separate the portion of the later period simu-
lation differences due to different conditions inherited fromprior periods
from the portion due to different response rules, in the currentperiod.
This can be done only indirectly.
It will be recalled that in the case of imperfect information the policy
reaction function is composed of two separable parts-the response tothe
state estimate and the state estimation process. The responseto perfect
information, on the other hand, is comprised of only one part, since the
state is known. However, the-response function in theperfect information
case, taking the state of the economy as the argument,is identical to the
TABLE 2
FIRST PERIOD DEVIATIONS IN SEVERAL ENDOGENOUS










(Index Level of 100 in 1958)
Actual Estimate ActualEstimate Actual Estimate
CN 8.8516 77026 .1855 .1626 0484 .0677
ECD 4.3838 3.4136 09t9 .0677 .0240 - .0091
INR 2.2136 1.3293 .0464 .03l2 0121 .0199
EH 1.3762 .3152 .0288 .0158 .0075 .0137
uN 4.5977 3.3010 .0964 .0727 .0251 .0395
ElM -2.5608 -16575 -.0537-036! -.0140 -.0065
EMPT 0 .0225 2303 .0887 - .0123 .0014
PGNP 0 .4065 0 .0172 .2967 .1176
XGNP and its components. In this case, however, the appropriatepolicy
direction to offset the PGNP shock was itself restrictive. Thus, the ap-
pearance of expansion given by the filter caused alarger move toward re-
straint even though the size of the increase in PGNP was itself under-
estimated. (See Table 2)
After the first period, it is more difficult to interpret the differences in
the patterns of response because the differing first period responses have
left different inherited conditions for the second period.Consequently,
different responses are called for, in part as a result of the differentin-
herited states of the economy and in part as a result of the differencesin
the policy formation mechanism. It is only in the first period thatthe re-
sults differ solely as a consequence of the assumption about the presence
or absence of observation error, so that we canfocus on this element
alone. However, the first period results clearly show that the assumption
of imperfect information typically builds in a systematic lag in recognition
and policy response, although other varieties of systematic distortion are
also encountered.
It would be desirable to separate the portion of the later period simu-
lation differences due to different conditions inherited from prior periods
from the portion due to different response rules, in the currentperiod.
This can be done only indirectly.
It will be recalled that in the case of imperfect information thepolicy
reaction function is composed of two separable parts-the response tothe
state estimate and the state estimation process. The response toperfect
information, on the other hand, is comprised of only one part, since the
state is known. However, the-response function inthe perfect information
case, taking the state of.the economy as the argument,is identical to the
TABLE 2
FIRST PERIOD DEVIATIONS IN SEVERAL ENDOGENOUS










(Index Level of 100 in 1958)
Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate
CN 8.8516 7.7026 .1855 .1626 .0484 .0677
ECD 4.3838 3.4136 .0919 .0677 .0240 - .0091
INR 2.2136 1.3293 .0464 .03l2 .0121 .0199
EH 1.3762 .3152 .0288 .0158 .0075 .0137
uN 4.5977 3.3010 .0964 .0727 .0251 .0395
ElM -2.5608 -1.6575 -.0537 -.0361 -.0140 -.0065
EMPT 0 .0225 .2303 .0887 - .0123 .0014
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7response function in the imperfect information case, taking thestate esti-
mate as the argument; the actual policyresponses differ solely on account
of differences between the state andstate estimate. Thus, it is not until
the state estimate and the actualstate have converged that the effect ofa
disturbance is no longer leading to differentresponses under the two as-
sumptions. Consequently, we canmeasure the degree to which the initial
disturbance is still leading to differing policyvalues over time by observ-
ing the state estimateerrors. In this way we can disentangle the two ele-
ments in later periods by focussing on the causal roleof the state estimate.
Since the state estimation apparatus is linear, thetime path of state
estimation errors resulting from theshock is independent of the policy
variable used. The time paths of state estimateerrors for XGNP, PGNP,
and EMPT are presented in Table 3. It isapparent that in severalin-
stances the state estimate errors in XGNP andEMPT tend to persist for
several quarters, while in othercases they die out rapidly. The errors in
the PGNP estimate are more generally persistent,with nearly one-half of
the initial error remaining in the second periodin each case. Clearly, in
each of the instances of persistingstate estimate error in any of these
variables, we can be certain of systematicpolicy distortion and a delay
in appropriate response.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have shown thatan appropriate policy response to
imperfect data necessarily means that economicdisturbances will not re-
ceive full response immediately. In thecase of shocks in expenditure vari-
ables, the simulations clearly showeda systematic weak initial policy
response. However, .covariance relationships used in estimatingthe cur-
rent state of the economy can also leadto other types of systematic dis-
tortions in policy response. Ina number of cases, the errors in the state
estimates, and hence in policyresponse, persisted for several periods. The
results presented show a caution in policyresponse, despite the fixed co-
efficient framework used. Thus,we have a source of caution in policyre-
sponse complementary to that brought about by randomcoefficients and
multiplier uncertainty, such as discussed byBrainard [3].
The results presented above have clear implicationsfor the evaluation
of the performance of policymakers. Weshould not assess their actions
on the basis of the actual data available at the time, sincewhat policy re-
sponse is appropriate depends both on the quality of thepreliminary data
and on its actual value.
REFERENCES
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